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ABSTRACT
Interacting with Ethereum smart contracts can have potentially devastating financial con-
sequences. In light of this, several regulatory bodies have called for a need to audit smart
contracts for security and correctness guarantees. Unfortunately, auditing smart contracts
that do not have readily available source code can be challenging, and there are currently
few tools available that aid in this process. Such contracts remain opaque to auditors. To
address this, we present Erays, a reverse engineering tool for smart contracts without the
need for source code. Erays takes in smart contract from the Ethereum blockchain and
produces high-level pseudocode suitable for manual analysis. We show how Erays can be
used to provide insight into several contract properties, such as code complexity and code
reuse in the ecosystem. We then leverage Erays to link contracts with no previously avail-
able source code to public source code, thus reducing the overall opacity in the ecosystem.
Finally, we demonstrate how Erays can be used for reverse-engineering in four case studies:
high-value multi-signature wallets, arbitrage bots, exchange accounts, and finally, a popular
smart-contract game, Cryptokitties. We conclude with a discussion regarding the value of
reverse engineering in the smart contract ecosystem, and how Erays can be leveraged to
address the challenges that lie ahead.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Ethereum is the second largest cryptocurrency. A prominent feature of Ethereum is smart
contract. Smart contracts are programs that automatically execute blockchain transactions
as defined by the developer. Due to the nature of verified and irreversible transactions on
the blockchain, smart contracts can be used to facilitate a wide range of tasks, including
crowdfunding, decentralized exchanges, digital wallet and supply-chain tracking [1].
Ethereum smart contracts are used to manage large balance of cryptocurrency. In 2018,
Ethereum smart contracts hold over worth of $10B USD1. Unfortunately, smart contracts
are error-prone [2, 3, 4]. The high financial risk when interacting with faulty smart contracts
has drawn the attention of several regulatory bodies, including the FTC [5] and the SEC [6],
which intent to audit smart contracts to prevent unexpected financial consequences.
Smart contracts are publicly available in its compiled from on the blockchain. However,
the compiled binary is consist of low level Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) operations,
making it difficult for manual analysis. By default, smart contracts also do not provide the
high level source code, making them opaque to auditors.
We start by characterizing the opacity in the Ethereum smart contract ecosystem. We
crawl the Ethereum blockchain for all contracts and collect a total of 34K unique smart
contracts up until January 3rd, 2018. Of these, 26K (77.3%) have no readily available
source code. These contracts are involved with 12.7M (31.6%) transactions, and hold $3B
USD worth of ETH.
To better understand these opaque contracts, we present Erays, a reverse engineering tool
for Ethereum smart contracts. Erays takes as input a compiled EVM smart contract from
the blockchain and outputs high-level pseudocode suitable for manual analysis. To build
Erays, we apply a number of well-known techniques in program analysis and decompilation.
Notably, Erays transforms EVM from a stack-based language to a register based machine to
ease readability of the output for the end-user.
We leverage Erays to measure the code complexity and code reuse in the ecosystem. We
further demonstrate how it can be used to link smart contracts that have no readily available
source code to publicly available source code. We build a “fuzzy hash” mechanism that can
compare two smart contracts and identify whether a function in one contract has similar
syntactic structure to functions in another contract. Using this technique, we are able to map
a median 50% of functions and 14.7% of instructions per opaque contract, giving immediate
partial insight to opaque contracts in the ecosystem.
1At the time of writing in February 2018 the Ethereum to USD conversion is approximately $1.2K USD
per ETH
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Finally, we show how Erays works as a reverse engineering tool applied to four case
studies—high-value multi-signature wallets, arbitrage bots, exchange accounts, and finally,
a popular smart contract game, Cryptokitties. In investigating high-value wallets, we were
able to reverse engineer the access control policies of a large commercial exchange. We find
some standard policies, however, also uncover ad-hoc security devices involving timers and
deposits. In studying arbitrage contracts, we find examples of new obfuscation techniques.
We then successfully reverse engineer the opaque portion of code from the Cryptokitties
game, which plays a role in ensuring fair gameplay. In all of these cases, we find that opacity
is expected and sometimes important to the correct functionality of these contracts. In light
of this, we posit that smart contract developers may be expecting to achieve “security by
obscurity” by withholding their high level code.
We conclude with a discussion of the value of audits, reverse engineering, and where Erays
can aid in solving the growing needs of the Ethereum community. We hope Erays will prove
useful to the security and cryptocurrency communities to address the challenges that lie
ahead.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies. A blockchain is a distributed network that main-
tains a globally consistent log of transactions. Public blockchains, such as Bitcoin [7] and
Ethereum [8], are typically implemented as open peer-to-peer networks, based on proof-of-
work mining. Cryptocurrencies are virtual currencies implemented on a public blockchain,
where the transactions are digitally signed messages that transfer balances from one user
account (i.e., public key) to another.
Ethereum Smart Contracts. In addition to user accounts, Ethereum also features smart
contract accounts. A contract account is associated with a fragment of executable code,
located at an account address. Smart contracts make up approximately 5% of the total
Ethereum accounts, account for 31.2% of the overall transactions, and hold 9.4% of total
Ether in their balances.
A smart contract is executed when a user submits a transaction with the contract as
the recipient. Users include payload data in the transaction, which in turn is provided as
input to the smart contract program. A contract is arranged as a collection of external
functions identified by 4-byte signatures, which users can invoke. A contract can also trigger
the execution of another smart contract through a CALL instruction that sends a message,
similar to a remote procedure call in other programming paradigms.
Smart contract execution must be replicated by validating nodes on the network. To
prevent resource exhaustion, users that create transactions must pay an amount of gas for
every opcode executed, which translates to certain amount of Ether depending on a market
rate.
Contracts are executed in a virtual environment known as the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM). EVM defines a machine language called EVM bytecode, which includes approxi-
mately 150 opcodes [8]. EVM is a stack-based machine, where opcodes read and write from
an operand stack. EVM further provides memory and storage for additional functional-
ity. Memory is specified as an array used to store volatile data during contract execution.
Storage is a key-value store indexed by 256-bit values (one EVM-word). Unlike memory,
storage persists across the execution history of a contract and is stored as a part of the global
blockchain state.
Developers typically write smart contract code in high-level languages, which are then com-
piled into EVM bytecode. In 2018, the most popular programming language for Ethereum
smart contracts is Solidity [9]. Solidity syntax is heavily influenced by Javascript and C++,
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and supports a number of complex language features, such as inheritance, libraries, and
user-defined types.
Ethereum-based Tokens. In addition to the built-in Ether currency, the Ethereum
blockchain is also widely used as a host for “tokens”, which are separate currency-like
instruments built on top of a smart contract. There are currently more than 33K such
contracts on the Ethereum network. Tokens can be traded as currencies on a variety of
market exchanges. Together, the total market capitalization of tokens exceeds $60B worth
of USD.1 Tokens today are used to support a variety of functions, such as crowd-funding
and exchanges.
1At the time of writing in February 2018, the Ethereum to USD conversion is approximately $1.2K USD
per ETH.
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CHAPTER 3: OPACITY IN SMART CONTRACTS
The bytecode for every smart contract is readily available on the blockchain. However,
bytecode alone is is difficult to read and understand, limiting its use in effectively determining
what a smart contract does. We begin our analysis of smart contracts by first investigating
how many contracts can not be immediately linked back to source code, and characterizing
how important those contracts are in the ecosystem.
3.1. COLLECTING AND COMPILING CONTRACTS
In order to investigate contracts with missing source code, we first collect all Ethereum
smart contracts from the beginning of the blockchain through January 3rd, 2018. This
resulted in 1,024,886 contract instances. Not all of these contracts have unique bytecode.
After removing duplicates, we find only 34,328 unique contracts, which is a 97% reduction
in contracts from the original set.
In order to determine how many blockchain contracts have readily accessible source code,
we turned to Etherscan [10]. Etherscan has become the de facto source for Ethereum
blockchain exploration. Etherscan offers a useful feature called “verified” contracts, where
contract writers can publish source code associated with blockchain contracts. Etherscan
then independently verifies that the compiled source code produces exactly the bytecode
available at a given address. Etherscan then makes the verified source available to the pub-
lic. We scraped Etherscan for all verified contracts as of January 3rd, 2018, collecting a total
of 10,387 Solidity files.
We then compiled the Etherscan verified contracts to determine exact bytecode matches
with blockchain contracts. Etherscan provides the precise compiler version for each verified
source file, so to begin, we compiled each source file with its provided compiler version.
Type Contracts Transactions Balance (Ether)
Total 1,024,886 40,380,705 (100%) 9,884,533 (100%)
Unique 34,328 40,380,705 (100%) 9,884,533 (100%)
Opaque 26,594 12,753,734 (31.6%) 2,559,745 (25.9%)
Transparent 7,734 27,626,971 (68.4%) 7,324,788 (74.1%)
Table 3.1: Opacity in Ethereum Blockchain—We show the opacity of contracts in
the Ethereum blockchain, as well as the number of transactions and Ether in each
category. Although opaque contracts make up 77.3% of unique contracts, they only
account for 31.6% of the transactions and 25.9% of the Ether held by contracts.
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From these, we collected 7.5K unique binaries. To identify variants of contracts that were
compiled with older versions of the Solidity compiler, we aggregated every major compiler
version from v0.1.3 to v0.4.19 and compiled each contract with every version. In total,
from the seed set of 10.4K source files, we collected 88.4K unique binaries across 35 compiler
versions.
3.2. OPACITY
We next investigated contract opacity in the Ethereum ecosystem today. Of the 1M
contract instances, we could not successfully match 965K, or 96.5% to any compiled source
code. We find that of the 34K unique contracts, we are able to successfully match 7.7K
( 22.7%) of contracts. Unfortunately, this leaves 77.3% of unique contracts opaque.
We next turn to the question of how important these 77.3% of contracts are to the ecosys-
tem. To quantify importance, we use two metrics: the amount of money stored in each
contract, and the transaction volume (by number of transactions) with each contract. Ta-
ble 3.1 shows a breakdown of the contracts in our dataset by these two metrics. Although
opaque contracts make up most of the smart contracts in the ecosystem, we find that they are
in the minority by both transaction volume and balance. Opaque contracts are transacted
with 12.7M times, compared with transparent contracts, which are transacted with 27.6M
times. In addition, opaque contracts only hold $3.1B USD, while transparent contracts
hold $7.3B USD. Although it appears that transparency in the ecosystem prevails, the
fact remains that 12.7M interactions with contracts and a total of $3.1B USD are held in
contracts for which auditors and regulators have no insight into.
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEM DESIGN
In order to investigate opaque contracts in the Ethereum ecosystem, we introduce Erays,
an EVM reverse engineering tool. Erays takes a hex encoded contract as input and trans-
forms it into human readable expressions. In this chapter, we describe the transformations
Erays makes in order to build human-readable representations of smart contracts.
4.1. DISASSEMBLY AND BASIC BLOCK IDENTIFICATION
In the first stage, we disassemble the hex string into EVM instructions, and then partition
these instructions into basic blocks. A basic block is a linear code sequence with a single
entry point and single exit point [11]. We generate the instructions using a straightforward
linear sweep [12]. Starting from the first byte in the hex string, each byte is sequentially
decoded into the corresponding instruction.
Next, we aggregate instructions into their resultant basic blocks. These are derived
through two simple rules. Instructions that alter the control flow (i.e., exits or branches)
mark block exit, while the special instruction JUMPDEST marks block entry. When all block
entries and exits are identified, basic block partitioning is complete. Code Block 4.1 shows
an example of this transformation.
4.2. CONTROL FLOW GRAPH RECOVERY
In this stage, we recover the control flow graph (CFG) [11] from the basic blocks. A CFG
is a directed graph where each node represents a basic block and each edge denotes a branch
between two blocks. In a directed edge b0 → b1, we refer to b1 as the successor of b0.
At its core, recovering a CFG from basic blocks requires identifying the successor(s) of each
basic block.
To determine the successor(s) for a basic block b, we need to examine the last instruction
in the block. There are three cases:
1. An instruction that does not alter control flow
2. An instruction that halts execution (STOP, REVERT, INVALID, RETURN, SELFDESTRUCT)
3. An instruction that branches (JUMP, JUMPI)
In the first case, control simply flows to the next block in the sequence, making that block
the successor of b. In the second case, since the execution is terminated, b would have
no successor. In the last case, the successor depends on the target address of the branch
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hex instruction
b0:
6000 PUSH1 0x60
54 SLOAD
600a PUSH1 0xa
6008 PUSH1 0x8
56 JUMP
b1:
5b JUMPDEST
56 JUMP
...
Listing 4.1: Assembly Code— We show (part of the) input hex string disassembled
and then divided into basic blocks.
instruction, which requires closer scrutiny.
Indirect branches present a challenge when determining the target address [13]. In a
direct branch, the destination address is derived within the basic block and thus can be
computed easily. In an indirect branch, however, the destination address is placed on the
stack before entering a block. Consider block b1 in Code Block 4.1. As mentioned, the
destination address is on the top of the stack upon entering the block. We therefore cannot
determine the destination address from block b1 alone.
To address this issue with indirect branches, we model the stack state in our CFG recovery
algorithm, shown in Code Block 4.2. The algorithm follows a conventional pattern for CFG
recovery [13]: we analyze a basic block, identify its successors, add them to the CFG, then
recursively analyze the successors.
When analyzing a block, we model the stack effects of instructions. The PUSH instructions
are modeled with concrete values placed on the stack. All other instructions are modeled
only insofar as their effect on stack height. Consider the first two instructions in block b0
in Code Block 4.1. Suppose we start with an empty stack at the block entry. The first
instruction PUSH1 0x60 will push the constant 0x60 on the stack. The second instruction
SLOAD will consume the 0x60 to load an unknown value from storage.
Using this model, we effectively emulate through the CFG, triggering all reachable code
blocks. At each block entrance reached, we compare the current stack image with stack
images observed thus far. If a stack image has already been recorded, the block would lead
to a path that has already been explored, and so the recovery algorithm backtracks.
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explore(block, stack):
if stack seen at block:
return
mark stack as seen at block
for instruction in block:
update stack with instruction
save stack state
if block ends with jump:
successor_block = stack.resolve_jump
add successor_block to CFG
explore(successor_block, stack)
if block falls to subsequent_block:
revert stack state
add subsequent_block to CFG
explore(subsequent_block, stack)
Listing 4.2: CFG Recovery Algorithm— We analyze a basic block, identify its
successors, add them to the CFG, then recursively analyze the successors
4.3. LIFTING
In this stage, we lift EVM’s stack-based instructions into a register-based instructions.
The register-based instructions preserve most operations defined in the EVM specification.
Additionally, a few new operations are introduced to make the representation more concise
and understandable:
INTCALL, INTRET: These two instructions call and return from an internal function, re-
spectively. Unlike external functions invoked through CALL, internal functions are implicitly
triggered through JUMP instructions. We heuristically identify the internal function calls 1,
which allows further simplification of the CFG.
ASSERT: As in many high level languages, this instruction asserts a condition. The solid-
ity compiler inserts certain safety checks (e.g., array bounds checking) into each produced
compiled contract. In order to eliminate redundant basic blocks, we replace these checks
with ASSERT.
NEQ, GEQ, LEQ, SL, SR: These instructions correspond to “not equal”, “greater than or
equal”, “less than or equal”, "shift left", and “shift right”. While these operations are not
part of the original EVM instruction set, the functionalities are frequently needed. These
instructions allow us to collapse more verbose EVM instructions equences (e.g., sequence
1The details of the heuristic are included in the internal function identification section
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EQ, ISZERO) into one NEQ instruction.
MOVE: This instruction copies a register value or a constant value to a register. The
instructions SWAP (swap two stack items), DUP (duplicate a stack item) and PUSH (push a
stack item) are all translated into MOVE instructions.
To derive the registers on which the instructions operate, we map each stack word to a
register, ranging from $s0 to $s1023 because the EVM stack is specified to have a maximum
size of 1,024 words. Additionally, we introduce two other registers in our intermediate
representation, namely $m and $t. The Solidity compiler uses memory address 0x40 to store
the free memory pointer. Since that pointer is frequently accessed, we use $m to replace all
references to that memory word. The $t register is used as a temporary register for SWAP
instructions.
Each instruction is then assigned appropriate registers to replace its dependency on the
stack. Consider the instruction ADD as an example. ADD pops two words off of the stack,
adds them together, and pushes the result back onto the stack. In our instruction, ADD reads
from two registers, adds the values, and writes back to a register. Figure 4.1 shows both the
stack and the registers during an ADD operation. A key observation is that in order to read
and write the correct registers, the stack height must be known [14]. In this example, the
initial stack height is three, so the ADD reads from $s1 and $s2, and writes the result back
to $s1. Our translation for this instruction would be ADD $s1, $s2, $s1, where we place
the write_register before read_registers.
$s3
$s2 0x5
$s1 0x3 0x8
$s0 0x4 0x4
Figure 4.1: Lifting an ADD Instruction—We show both the stack image and the
registers before and after an ADD is executed. The initial stack height is three, thus, ADD
reads from $s1 and $s2, and writes back the result to $s1.
Knowing the precise stack height is crucial to lifting. As described previously, we collect
the stack images for each block during CFG recovery. Given the stack height at the block
entrance, all the instructions within the block can be lifted. Code Block 4.3 shows an
example of a basic block being lifted given a stack height of three at the block entrance.
We note that the stack images recorded at a block might disagree on height. In most cases,
the discrepancy arises from internal function, which is resolved by introducing INTCALL. In
other cases, we duplicate the reused block for each unique height observed.
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PUSH1 0x1 MOVE $s3, 0x1
SLOAD SLOAD $s3, [$s3]
DUP2 MOVE $s4, $s2
LT LT $s3, $s4, $s3
ISZERO ISZERO $s3, $s3
PUSH1 0x65 MOVE $s4, 0x65
JUMPI JUMPI $s4, $s3
Listing 4.3: Lifting A Block— We show a block of stack-based instructions lifted to
register-based instructions given initial stack height of three.
4.4. INTERNAL FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION
Function identification is an important part of lifting process. As mentioned previously, we
introduce INTCALL, INTRET in place of function calls. In our heuristic, an internal function
is assumed to have a single entry and a single exit. Consequently, there are four basic
blocks involved in an internal call that we name caller_begin, callee_entry, callee_exit
and caller_end. The caller_begin issues the call by branching to callee_entry, and
eventually callee_exit returns to the caller by branching to caller_end.
We note that callee may have multiple callers. As a result, for an internal function,
there is one pair of callee_entry and callee_exit, but there may be multiple pairs of
caller_begin and caller_end. Figure 4.2a illustrates an example callee with two callers.
We start by identifying callee_exit. We observe that callee_exit would normally end
with an indirect branch, where the branch address is produced by caller_begin. Moreover,
callee_exit should have more than one successors (the caller_ends).
We then correlate each caller_end with its caller_begin. As mentioned previously, the
branch address produced by caller_begin guides the callee to caller_end. During the
CFG recovery, we keep track of where each constant is generated, which enables the corre-
lation. As we identify the caller_begins, the callee_entry is their common successor.
We then use INTCALL as an abstraction for the callee. The subgraph for the callee is first
extracted using the CFG recovery algorithm. For each caller_begin, we insert an INTCALL,
and also replace its branch from callee_entry to the corresponding caller_end. The
INTCALL, when “executed”, will transfer the control flow to the callee. For the callee_exit,
we insert an INTRET to replace its indirect branch to caller_ends. The INTRET, when
“executed”, will transfer the control flow back to the caller. Figure 4.2b illustrates the
transformations.
To make lifting possible, we also need to determine the number of items popped off and
pushed onto the stack by INTCALL. In the EVM specification, these are referred to as the
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callee subgraph
caller_begin_0
callee_entry
call
caller_begin_1
call
callee_exit
caller_end_0
return
caller_end_1
return
(a) before callee is
extracted
caller_begin_0
caller_end_0
caller_begin_1
caller_end_1
(b) after callee is
extracted
Figure 4.2
delta, stack_size = 0, 0
for bytecode in sequence:
stack_size -= bytecode.delta
delta = min(delta, stack_size)
stack_size += bytecode.alpha
delta = -delta
alpha = stack_size + delta
Listing 4.4: Computing the Delta and Alpha of a Sequence
delta (δ) and alpha (α) of an operation. For an INTCALL, they can be interpreted as the
number of arguments and return values.
We note that a sequence of bytecode instructions can be viewed as a single operation, thus
the delta and alpha value of the sequence computed in the manner shown in 4.4.
The stack size is initialized to be zero upon entering the sequence. When the it becomes
negative, the sequence is reading prepositioned values. Delta is therefore set to the negation
of the minimal stack size. The end stack size indicates the number of values produced by
the sequence, but we also need to account for the values popped off the stack. Therefore
alpha is the end stack size plus the delta value.
For an INTCALL, we select a path from callee_entry to callee_exit, and compute its
delta and alpha. We note that in most cases, the return address is the first argument (at
the bottom of the initial stack) and will be popped off eventually, which allows us to fully
exhaust the function arguments.
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SLOAD $s3, [0x1]
GEQ $s3, $s2, $s3
JUMPI 0x65, $s3
Listing 4.5: Optimizing A Block—We show the optimized version of Code Block 4.3.
4.5. OPTIMIZATION
During the optimization phase, we apply several compiler optimizations to our interme-
diate representation. We mainly utilize data flow based optimizations, including constant
folding, constant propagation, copy propagation and dead code elimination. The details
of these algorithms are outside the scope of this paper, but they are well described in the
literature [15, 16, 17].
The optimizations mentioned aim to simplify the code body. A significant number of
available EVM instructions are dedicated to moving stack values. As a result, the lifted
code contains many MOVE instructions that simply copy data around. These optimizations
eliminate such redundancy in the instructions. Code Block 4.5 shows the optimized version
of the block from Code Block 4.3. In the example, all the MOVE instructions are eliminated.
We also note that the LT, ISZERO sequence is further reduced to GEQ.
4.6. AGGREGATION
Aggregation aims to further simplify the produced intermediate representation by replac-
ing many instructions with their analog, compact versions that we term “aggregated expres-
sions.” Unlike instructions, expressions can be nested arbitrarily, bearing more resemblance
to high level languages.
To begin aggregation, instructions are converted into expressions in three-address form [16].
Each expression is a combination of an assignment and an operator, with the write_register
to the left of the assignment and the operator along with the read_registers to the right
of the assignment. Code Block 4.6 shows the conversion.
SLOAD $s3, [0x1] $s3 = S[0x1]
GEQ $s3, $s2, $s3 $s3 = $s2 ≥ $s3
JUMPI 0x65, $s3 if ($s3) goto 0x65
Listing 4.6: Three-Address Form—We show the Code Block 4.5 in three-address form.
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assert(0x0 == msg.value)
$s2 = c[0x4]
while (0x1) {
if ($s2 >= s[0x0])
break
if ($s2 <= 0xa) {
$s2 = 0x2 + $s2
}
$s2 = 0xc + $s2
}
m[$m] = $s2
return($m, (0x20 + $m) - $m)
Listing 4.7: Structural Analysis—A simple example of the final output of Erays, where
control flow structures are recovered from blocks of expressions.
Next, we aggregate expressions based on the definitions and usages of registers. A defi-
nition is in the form $r = RHS, where $r is a register and RHS is an expression. For each
subsequent usage of $r, we replace it with RHS as long as it is valid to do so. We cease
propagating a given definition when either $r is redefined or any part of RHS is redefined.
Combined with dead code elimination, the aggregation process pushes the definitions down
to their usages, producing a more compact output. Consider the example in Code Block
4.6, by aggregating the first expression into the second one, and then the second into the
third, the block can be summarized into a single expression:
if ($s2 ≥ S[0x1]) goto 0x65
4.7. CONTROL FLOW STRUCTURE RECOVERY
We employ structural analysis [18] algorithms to recover high level control constructs
(control flow structure recovery). Constructs such as “while” and “if then else” are recovered
through pattern matching and collapsing the CFG. If a region is found to be irreducible,
we leave the goto expression unchanged. Moreover, each external function is separated by
walking through a jump-table like structure at the entrance of the CFG. Code Block 4.7
shows an external function as an example.
14
4.8. VALIDATION
Erays transforms the contract into more readable expressions. In order to make use of the
expressions for further analysis, we must first validate that they are correct. The correctness
is evaluated through testing. Given specific contract inputs, we “execute” our representation
and check if it produces the correct outputs.
We use go-ethereum (Geth) to generate ground truth for the expected behavior. By
replaying an execution (transaction), Geth outputs a debug trace, which is a sequence of
execution steps. Each step is a snapshot of the EVM machine state, which includes the
opcode executed, the program counter, the stack image, the memory image, and the storage
image.
We then “execute” our representation and confirm the result is consistent with the debug
trace. For that purpose, we implement a virtual machine that runs our representations.
During the execution, the arguments of an expression are first evaluated, then the operation
itself is executed given the arguments. There are three classes of operations that need to be
treated differently.
In the first case, the operations retrieve some inputs for the contract. As an example,
CALLDATALOAD fetches part of the input data (calldata). Operations that are dependent on
the blockchain world state also fall into this category. An example would be the BLOCKHASH,
which fetches the hash of a recently completed block. For this class of operations, we look
up the resultant value from the debug trace. If an operation is missing in the trace (original
trace never issued such call), we mark it as a failure.
In the second case, the operations update the blockchain (world) state. Such operations
include storage updates, contract creation, log updates and message calls. We also consider
RETURN as a member of this category. These operations define the core semantics of a
contract. By making sure that all these operations are executed with the right arguments
(memory buffers are checked if applicable), we ensure that our representation is correct. If
our execution ends up missing or adding any such operations, we mark it as a failure.
The rest of the operations fall into the third case. These operations include the arithmetic
operations, memory operations, as well as all the new operations we introduce in our repre-
sentation. The semantics of the operations are implemented in our virtual machine. As an
example, when executing $s3 = $s2 + $s3, we would load the values from $s2 and $s3,
sum them , modulo by 2256 (word size) and put the result in $s3. If our machine encounters
an exception during these operations, we mark it as a failure.
We leverage historical transactions on the blockchain to construct a set of tests. We start
with the set of unique contracts (34K) described in Chapter 3. Then, for each unique
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contract, we collect the most recent transaction up to January 3rd, 2018. In total, we
gathered 1˜5,855 transactions along with the corresponding contracts in our test set. We
note this is only 46% of all unique contracts—the remaining were never transacted with.
If Erays fails to generate the representation in the first place, we mark it as a “construction
failure”. If our representation behaves incorrectly, we mark it as a “validation failure”. In
total we fail 510 (3.22%) of the test set, among which 196 are “construction failures” and
314 are ‘validation failures”.
4.9. LIMITATIONS
Erays is not a full decompiler that produces recompilable Solidity code. The major limi-
tation is the readability of the output. While the output is relatively straightforward when
only common types are present (uint array, address), Erays cannot succinctly capture
operations on complex types such as mapping (uint => string). Erays’s implementation
can be improved in a few ways.
Erays does not perform variable recovery and type recovery. Previous work in that area
has been focusing on x86 architecture [19, 20]. Though operating with a different instruction
set, Erays could draw lessons from the techniques.
Erays uses naive structural analysis for structure recovery. There are several follow-up
works on improving the recovery process, including iterative refinement [21] and pattern-
independent structuring [22].
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CHAPTER 5: MEASURING OPAQUE SMART CONTRACTS
In this chapter, we leverage Erays to provide insight on code complexity and code reuse
in the ecosystem. Furthermore, we demonstrate how Erays can be used to reduce contract
opacity. We run Erays on the 34K unique contracts found on the Ethereum blockchain. We
fail to create CFGs for 445 (1.3%) unique binaries, which we exclude from our analysis.
5.1. CODE COMPLEXITY
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Figure 5.1: CDF Contract Blocks—We show the CDF of the number of basic blocks
in unique smart contracts. The median number of basic blocks is 100, which denote
relatively small programs. However, there is a long tail of very large contracts—the largest
contract contains a total of 13,045 basic blocks.
Our analysis tools give insight into the complexity of contracts found on the blockchain.
We begin by investigating the number of basic blocks in Ethereum contracts (Figure 5.1).
Most contracts are fairly small—the median number of blocks found in contracts is 100,
and these blocks contain a median 15 instructions. However, there is a long tail of more
complicated contracts. In the largest case, one contract contains a total of 13,045 blocks.
However, we find that this contract is one entirely filled with STOP instructions, which each
terminate their own basic block.
Basic blocks only give one flavor of contract complexity. Just as important are the edges
and the connections between the blocks in the CFG. To quantify this, we measure the
cyclomatic complexity of each contract, which is a popular software metric introduced by
Thomas McCabe [23]. Cyclomatic complexity measures the number of linearly independent
paths in a given control flow graph. McCabe suggested that a given function with cyclomatic
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Figure 5.2: Complexity of Contracts—We show the cyclomatic complexity of
contracts on the blockchain, by the fraction of functions in each contract with complexity
larger than 10. Only 34% of contracts have no functions in this criteria. The median is 0.3,
with a long tail of contracts that have increasingly complex functions.
complexity greater than 10 often needed to be refactored or redone, due to unnecessary
complexity and an increased chance of errors in the program. Past work has also noted a
weak relationship between increased cyclomatic complexity and software security [24].
Figure 5.2 shows a CDF McCabe complexity by the fraction of functions in contracts with
complexity > 10. We find that 79% of unique contracts do not contain a single function with
complexity greater than 10, which indicates that in addition to being small, many contracts
do not contain unnecessarily complex functionality. We additionally observe that there is
a long tail of complex contracts, and in the worst case, a handful of contracts are entirely
filled with overly complex functions.
We finally investigate how code complexity has evolved over time. Figure 5.3 shows both
the number of blocks and the McCabe complexity of new contracts over time. We find that
contracts are growing larger at a steady rate—the average number of blocks in contracts
published in January 2018 is 170, which is 350% greater than the first contracts published
in late 2015. However, we were surprised to find that McCabe complexity has not followed a
similar trend. Around January 2017, contract complexity declined, and has been relatively
stable since. This indicates that contract writers are writing code with better hygiene.
We note that around this time, there was a sharp rise in ERC20 Tokens on the Ethereum
blockchain, which tend to be larger contracts that contain an average of 226 blocks. However,
they are not particularly complex, and have an average McCabe complexity of 51.6, which
is smaller than many contracts in the ecosystem. ERC20 tokens make up 25% of the unique
binaries in our dataset.
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Figure 5.3: Longitudinal Complexity—We show the complexity of unique contracts
on the blockchain by the number of basic blocks and overall McCabe complexity.
Contracts have steadily increased in the number basic of blocks over time, indicating larger
contracts today. Despite this, contracts have not increased in overall McCabe complexity,
indicating better code hygiene.
Function Name Contracts Implementations
owner() 11,045 (32.2%) 63
balanceOf(address) 10,070 (29.3%) 240
transfer(address,uint256) 9,424 (27.5%) 1,759
name() 9,154 (26.7%) 109
symbol() 9.087 (26.4%) 120
decimals() 8,916 (26.0%) 96
totalSupply() 8,732 (25.4%) 200
allowance(address,address) 8,102 (23.6%) 152
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) 7,979 (23.2%) 1,441
approve(address,uint256) 7,713 (22.5%) 479
Table 5.1: Function Distribution—We show the distribution of functions in unique
smart contracts. All of the top functions are related to ERC20 tokens [25], which are
required to implement a specific interface.
5.2. CODE REUSE
Erays groups basic blocks into its higher-level functions. From these groupings, we can
further compare the structure and code of functions across contracts, giving us a useful metric
for determining function similarity. To enable this measurement, we interpret a function as
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a “set of blocks” and compare the sets across functions in different contracts. Each block,
however, may contain contract specific data that would render the comparison useless, such
as specific return address or other constants compiled into a block. In order to handle these
cases, we remove all references to constant data found in EVM opcodes. As an example,
consider the following code block:
hex opcode reduced hex
6060 PUSH1 0x60 60
6040 PUSH1 0x40 60
52 MSTORE 52
6004 PUSH1 0x4 60
36 CALLDATASIZE 36
10 LT 10
61006c PUSH2 0x6c 61
57 JUMPI 57
Listing 5.1: Reduced Block— We show how a block of code is reduced by removing the
constant values.
The block lists the original hex string, as well as the decoded opcode and the reduced
hex after removing constant values. We then take the hashes of the resultant blocks as
the “set” of blocks in a function, and compare these sets in further analysis. From here
on, we call this resultant hash set a function “implementation”. We find that there are a
handful of implementations that are found in many contracts; in the most extreme case, the
most popular function appears in 11K contracts. Unfortunately, many of the functions with
the same implementation are not particularly interesting—many are simply public “getter”
methods for specific data types. For example, the most popular function by implementation
is the public getter function for the uint256 data type.
We next turn to investigate popular external functions included in contracts, and the num-
ber of implementations of each of those functions. As mentioned previously, each external
function is identified via a 4-byte signature in each contract. Table 5.1 shows the top 10
function signatures found in our dataset. We note all of the top functions are related to the
ERC20 specification, which ERC20 tokens must conform to [25]. Interestingly, we find that
although these functions appear in several contracts, there are far fewer implementations of
each function. Some of these can be easily explained, for example, the decimals() function
is simply a ‘getter” method for getting the precision of a token. Other functions, however,
are harder to explain. The function transfer(address,uint256) typically contains busi-
ness logic for a token that defines how token transfers happen, and are somewhat custom.
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Figure 5.4: Opacity in Blockchain Contracts—We show the opacity in blockchain
contracts after applying Erays techniques. Contracts on the blockchain have a median
of 70% of their functions readily mapped to a function found in at least one verified source
code contract. The spike near the 70% mark is primarily due to the 7.7K contracts for
which we have exact source code matches. There are still 24.2% contracts that remain
entirely opaque.
However, despite appearing in 9.4K contracts, there are only 1.4K implementations in our
dataset. This indicates many contracts sharing the same implementation for such functions.
5.3. REDUCING CONTRACT OPACITY
A useful product of Erays is the ability to identify the functional similarity between two
EVM contracts (Section 5.2). We can extend this technique further to not just investigate
code reuse, but to reduce opacity in the ecosystem. We do this by leveraging the compiled
dataset of 88.4K binaries generated from verified Etherscan source code as described in
Chapter 3. From each of these compiled binaries, we extract its functions, and then compare
function implementations pairwise from the compiled binaries to binaries collected from the
blockchain. An exact function match to a compiled function thus immediately gives us the
source code for that function from its originating source file. We view this as similar to the
technique of “binary clone detection” [26, 27], a technique that overlays function symbols
onto stripped binaries using a full binary.
We apply this technique to the opaque contracts on the blockchain, i.e the ones that do
not have easily linkable source code. Among the 26K unique opaque contracts, we are able
to reduce the opacity of the opaque contracts to varying degrees. We are able to map a
median 50% of functions and 14.7% of instructions per opaque contract. Notably, we reveal
2.4 K unique contracts that we now have full source code for. These newly transparent
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Code Hash Ether Contracts TXs Verified Opacity Reduction (number of functions)
375196a08a62... 737,021 1 8 5 87.5%
0fb47c13d3b1... 466,648 1 3504 5 100%
69d802105576... 373,023 1 225 3 –
a08cfc07745d... 84,920 1 151 5 89.5%
319ee480a443... 76,281 3 7819 3 –
a8cc173d9aef... 67,747 3 83 3 –
037ca41c00d8... 67,317 1 20,742 3 –
20f46ba0d13a... 53,961 1 52 5 54.2%
88ec201907d7... 51,879 1 75 3 –
c5fbfc4b75ea... 43,418 13 104 5 0%
Table 5.2: Top Contracts by Balance—We show the top 10 contracts by balance, as
well as their transaction volume, whether they matched exactly to verified code, and their
opacity reduction after applying Erays if they did not match to source code. Of the top
contracts without source code, Erays was able to reduce their function opacity by an
average of 66%.
contracts are what we call “frankenstein” contracts—contracts for which source code comes
from multiple different contracts.
These techniques additionally improve the opacity in the ecosystem for top contracts.
Table 5.2 shows the top 10 contracts by balance held—the largest of which holds a total
of 737K Ether. Of these contracts, five could not be directly mapped to a verified source
contract. After applying Erays, we are able to successfully uncover an average of 66% of
the functions in each contract, and in one case, match 100% of the functions in the contract
exactly. This contract holds a total of 488K Ether, which in 2018, is valued at 500M USD.
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CHAPTER 6: REVERSE ENGINEERING CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, we show how Erays can be used as a reverse engineering tool in analyzing
opaque Ethereum smart contracts.
6.1. ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES OF HIGH-VALUE WALLETS
To begin our analysis, we investigate the opaque smart contracts with the highest Ether
balance. Using Erays, we find that many of these are multisignature wallets that require
multiple individuals to approve any transaction—a standard cryptocurrency security mea-
sure.
The opaque wallet with the largest balance contains $597M USD as of February 2018.
Through blockchain analysis using Etherscan, we observed that this contract was accessed
every week from the same account, 0xd244..., which belongs to Gemini, a large cryptocur-
rency exchange.1 This address also accesses two other high value, opaque wallets in our
dataset, with $381M and $164M USD in balance, respectively.
We use Erays to reverse engineer these contracts, and uncover their access control policies.
We find that the first two contracts are nearly identical. In order to withdraw money from
the wallet, they require two out of three administrator signatures. Any party can call
the requestWithdrawal method, however, the contract will not release the funds until the
approveWithdrawal function is invoked twice, with at least one invocation message signed
by an additional administrator. Thus far, the approveWithdrawal transactions are initiated
from a different address than the administrators. One administrator address has never been
used, indicating that runtime analysis would not adequately capture all of the aspects of
this contract.
The third Gemini contract contains a more complicated, time-based access control policy.
Withdrawals cannot be approved immediately, but instead must remain pending for a short
period of time. Through Erays, we find that the requestWithdrawalmethod in this contract
features a time dependency hazard, which is a known class of Solidity hazards. When
generating a unique identifier for a new withdrawal, the contract uses the hash of both a
global counter as well as the hash of the previously mined block. The dependence on the
previous block hash means that if a short “fork” happens in the blockchain, two different
log events for the same withdrawal may be received by the exchange. The exchange must,
1Gemini used this address to vote in a public referendum on Ethereum governance, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20180130153248/http://v1.carbonvote.com/
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as a result, take special care in responding to such log messages on the blockchain. We note
that in the past, cryptocurrency exchanges have failed to handle related hazards, resulting
in significant losses [28].
Access control policies used internally by financial services would typically be private, not
exposed to users or the public. However, due to the public nature of Ethereum bytecode, we
have demonstrated the potential to audit such policies when they are implemented as smart
contracts.
6.2. EXCHANGE ACCOUNTS.
We next investigate the contracts that appear most frequently on the blockchain. We
anticipated many of these contracts would simply be copy-paste contracts based on publicly
accessible code—however, we were surprised to find hundreds of thousands of identical con-
tracts, all opaque. We find that many of these contracts are associated with large exchanges
that create one contract instance for each user account.
Poloniex Exchange Wallets. The largest cluster of identical opaque contracts appears
a total of 349,612 times on the Ethereum blockchain. All of these contracts were created by
one address, 0xb42b...579, which is thought to be associated with the Poloniex exchange.2
We reverse engineer these contracts and uncover their underlying structure. We find that
Poloniex wallets define a customer to whom all wallet deposits are ultimately paid. They
directly transfer Ether to the customer whenever Ether is deposited into them, acting as an
intermediary between the Poloniex exchange and the customer.
Yunbi TokenWallets. We found another cluster of contracts that appeared 89,133 times
on the blockchain, that belongs to the Yunbi exchange. Through reverse engineering, we find
that the wallets allow any address to deposit Ether, but restrict withdrawal transactions to
a whitelisted administrator (Yunbi 0x42da...63dc). The administrator can trigger Ether
and token transfers from the wallet, however, the tokens are transferred out of the balance
of the Yunbi exchange—the address of the depositor does not ever own any tokens.
Exchange Splitting Contract. We found several opaque contracts thought to be gad-
gets used by the Geminicarbonvote and ShapeShift exchanges [29] to defend against replay
attacks following the hard fork between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. The contracts serve
2An Ethereum Developer on Reddit communicated with Poloniex regarding this address and confirmed
it belongs to them.
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as a splitter that sits between the exchange and users depositing to it, checking whether a
user is depositing coins to the Ethereum Classic chain or the Ethereum chain. Depending on
which chain the transaction appears on, the Ether value of the message is sent to a different
address.
Opacity in communications with financial institutions over the Internet is expected practice—
we do not see the code that runs the online banking services we use. This expectation has
seemingly carried over to Ethereum exchanges, but with unforeseen consequences: publicly
available bytecode for a particular program can be reverse engineered, and made simpler with
tools like Erays. An expectation for opacity is dangerous, as it may lead to lax attention to
security details.
6.3. ARBITRAGE BOTS ON ETHERDELTA.
We next leverage Erays to investigate the role of arbitrage bots on EtherDelta [30], a pop-
ular decentralized exchange. EtherDelta enables traders to deposit Ether or ERC20 tokens,
and then create open offers to exchange their currency for other currencies. EtherDelta is
the largest smart contract-based exchange by trade volume, with over $7 million USD daily
volume at the time of writing.
On occasion, arbitrage opportunities will appear on EtherDelta, where simultaneously
buying and selling a token across two currencies can yield an immediate profit. Such oppor-
tunities are short lived, since arbitrageurs compete to take advantage of favorable trades as
rapidly as possible. A successful arbitrage requires making a pair (or more) of simultaneous
trades. In order to reduce risk, many arbitrageurs have built Ethereum smart contracts that
send batch trades through EtherDelta. We use Erays to reverse engineer these contracts and
investigate their inner-workings.
To begin, we built a list of 30 suspected arbitrage contracts by scanning transactions
within blocks 3,900,000 to block 4,416,600, and selected contracts that both make internal
calls to EtherDelta and generate two trade events in a single transaction. To prune our
list, we ran our similarity metric (described in Section 5) over every pair of the 30 contracts
and found three clusters of highly similar (> 50% similarity) contracts. We then reverse
engineered one representative contract from each group.
All three clusters of contracts share the same high-level behavior. The arbitrageur initiates
a trade by sending a message to the contract, which first performs an access control check
to ensure that it is only invoked by the contract’s original creator. Next, the contract
queries the availableVolume method in EtherDelta, to identify how much of their open
offer remains for a given trade. For example, consider a trader who makes an offer of 10
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Ether at a price of $1,000 USD. If 8 Ether were purchased, availableVolume would return
a value of 2. If the contract finds there is sufficient balance on its open offer, it then calls
the trade function in EtherDelta twice, thus executing the arbitrage trade. If either trade
fails, the entire transaction is aborted using the REVERT opcode.
Several arbitrage contracts we investigated exhibited different variations of this behav-
ior. Immediately before calling the trade function, one group of contracts executes the
testTrade function, presumably in an attempt to reduce risk. However, since testTrade
calls the availableVolume function again, this is redundant and wastes gas.3 Another group
of contracts appears to obscure the values of their method arguments by performing an XOR
with a hardcoded mask. Such obfuscation is presumably intended to prevent network nodes
and other arbitrageurs from front-running or interfering with their transaction. However,
this thin veneer becomes transparent through reverse engineering with Erays.
6.4. DE-OBFUSCATING CRYPTOKITTIES
Cryptokitties is a popular smart contract based trading game on Ethereum. The game
involves buying, breeding, and selling virtual pets. As of January 29, 2018, the top 10
“kitties” are worth more than $2.5M combined. During their peak, they were so popular that
gas prices and transaction confirmation times slowed heavily due to Cryptokitties traffic [32,
33].
Although most of the Cryptokitties source code is published, a central component of the
game code is deliberately kept opaque in order to alter the gameplay. Cryptokitties contain
an opaque function, mixGenes(uint32, uint32):uint32, which creates a new kitty by
splicing together 32-byte genomes from each of two “parents”. Kitties are assigned certain
visual characteristics based on their genome, and rare attributes can yield very profitable
kitties. The gameplay effect of opacity is to make it challenging for users to “game” the
gene splicing contract in order to increase the chances of breeding a rare cat. Although the
high-level code is known to the developers, the developers have committed to a policy of not
playing the game or utilizing this information. As a final case study, we apply Erays to the
Cryptokitties contract.
With 3 hours of reverse engineering work using Erays, we were able to create a Solidity con-
tract whose output exactly matches the output of the mixGenes function on the blockchain.
We find that the mixGenes function is comprised of three main parts. The first selects the
randomness that will be used: if the hash of the input block number is 0, it is masked with
3See Chen et al [31] for a survey of underoptimization in Ethereum contracts.
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the current block number. The new block number and its hash are concatenated with the
parent’s genes as input to the keccak256 hash function, whose output is used as the source
of randomness for the rest of the execution. Second, the genes of each parent are split into 5
bit segments and mixed. For each 5-bit gene, one of the parents’ genes is chosen as the out-
put gene with 50% probability. Finally, a particular gene is mutated with 25% probability if
the larger of the two parents’ corresponding gene is less than 23 and with 12.5% probability
otherwise.
Concurrent to our work in reverse engineering, at least three other teams also attempted
to reverse engineer the mixGenes function [34, 35, 36]. Their analysis largely leverages
transaction tracing and blockchain analysis to reverse engineer the “protocol” of the con-
tract. Erays does not rely on transaction data—it directly translates the bytecode to high
level pseudocode. As a result, uncommon or unused control paths that do not appear in
transaction traces, such as Cryptokitties mutations, can be replicated faithfully.
Deliberate opacity does not serve the intended purpose of black-boxing the gene mixing
functionality. Reconstructing the logic and control flow of the contract using Erays, we
identify two opportunities to exploit the game with more effective husbandry. First, we can
identify kitties with genes valued 23 or greater which are less likely to encounter random
mutation when breeding. Second, since randomness is chosen based on block hashes at the
time giveBirth is called, we can wait to submit the giveBirth transaction until after a
block hash that results in favorable breeding.
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CHAPTER 7: RELATED WORK
Program analysis. Our work is guided by existing works in program analysis [11, 37, 17],
as well as studies in decompilation [38, 21, 39]. We draw valuable experience from existing
optimization frameworks on JVM. In particular, our system design is largely influenced by
Soot [14] and Marmot [40].
Blockchain measurement. Our work is closely related to prior efforts in measurement
and analysis of Ethereum and other public blockchains. Much of the analysis on the
Bitcoin blockchain has focused on clustering transactions by usage patterns (e.g., gam-
bling or trading) [41] and measuring the performance of the underlying peer-to-peer net-
work [42, 43, 44, 45].
Bartoletti and Pompianu provide a taxonomy of the transparent Ethereum contracts avail-
able from the Etherscan “verified source” dataset [46], whereas our work is the first to analyze
opaque contracts. Bartoletti et al. provide a survey of known smart contract vulnerabili-
ties [47].
Comparison with existing Ethereum smart contract analysis tools. Our reverse
engineering tool is complementary to a wide range of existing tools in the Ethereum ecosys-
tem:
Symbolic Execution Engines. There are several symbolic execution engines for Ethereum
smart contracts, including Oyente [48], Manticore [49], and Mythril [50]. These tools also
operate on EVM bytecode, they focus primarily on detecting known classes of vulnerabilities,
rather than assisting reverse engineering.
Debuggers. Several tools provide debugging utilities, including Remix [51] and Geth. De-
buggers enable an analyst to step through a trace of contract execution, which is helpful
in understanding the contract. Although debugging at the EVM opcode level is feasible,
debugging with the aid of higher level representations is preferable if available.
Decompilers. Porosity is the only other decompiler we know of that produces Solidity from
EVM bytecode. We ran Porosity over the 34K unique contracts in our dataset to evaluate
how well it performs in comparison to Erays. Porosity produces high-level source code
without error for only 1,818 (5.3%) unique contracts. In contrast, Erays produces aggregated
expression for 33,542 (97.7%).
Exploit Generator. TEETHER [52] is a tool that automatically creates exploits on smart
contracts. TEETHER is a concurrent work with Erays.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION
We have shown the feasibility of reverse engineering opaque contracts on Ethereum blockchain.
Reverse engineering tools like Erays make it easier to reconstruct high level source code even
when none is available. We envision that reverse engineering may be used by “white hate”
security teams or regulatory bodies in order to carry out public audits of the Ethereum
blockchain. Regardless, reverse engineering remains expensive, and such audits would be
simplified if the high-level source were available in the first place. We suggest that the
Ethereum community should adopt technical mechanisms and conventions that increase the
transparency of smart contract programs. Etherscan’s verified source code is a step in the
right direction, but more work must be done in order to improve transparency in the ecosys-
tem.
Why are so many contracts opaque, given the ease of publishing source code to Ether-
scan? In some cases, opacity may be a deliberate decision in order to achieve security
through obscurity. Another explanation is that publishing Solidity source code is not yet a
strong default, and infrastructure support is only partial. For example, we are not aware
of any other block explorer services besides Etherscan that provides a Verified Source code
repository. Although Ethereum features a decentralized standard called “Swarm” that sup-
ports publishing a contract’s Application Bytecode Interface (ABI), including the method
signatures and argument types, this standard does not include the full source code. This
standard should be extended to support high-level source code as well.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
Many Ethereum smart contracts on the blockchain are opaque, where source code is not
easily linkable. These contracts accounts for a significant part of the Ethereum ecosystem:
there are 26K (77.3%) unique contracts that are opaque, which control $3.1B USD in
balance, and are transacted with a total of 12.7M (31.6%) times. Opaque contracts are
hard to understand and audit, since they are composed of low level machine language (EVM
bytecode). To gain insight into these contracts, we introduced Erays, a reverse engineering
tool for EVM. Erays lifts EVM bytecode into higher level representations suitable for manual
analysis. We first showed how Erays can be used to quantify code complexity, identify code
reuse, and reduce opacity in the smart contract ecosystem. We then applied Erays to four
reverse-engineering case studies: high-value multi-signature wallets, arbitrage bots, exchange
accounts, and finally, a popular smart contract game. We identified that smart contract
developers may be expecting obscurity for the correct functionality of their contracts, and
may be expecting to achieve “security by obscurity” in withholding their high level code. We
hope Erays will prove useful for both the security and Ethereum communities in improving
the transparency in Ethereum.
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